
Experimental Study of Avian Influenza Virus (H9N2) Transmission


**- in a replica of the live poultry market stall
environment**

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
Live Poultry Markets in Hong Kong

- Risk factor associated with 1997 human H5N1 infection
 - Spordically cases of H5N1 in poultry and human
 - Continuing circulation of low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (H9N2, H6N1) in live poultry markets
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
Live Poultry Market System in Hong Kong SAR (1997)



Live Poultry Marketing System in Hong Kong SAR (Post 1997)



Wholesale Live Poultry Market




Retail Live Poultry Markets






Market replica study

- 3 groups (100 chickens each group)
 - Artificially infected chickens (H9N2)
 - Chicken turnover rate
 - Week 1: 0
 - Week 2: 25%
 - Week 3: 50%
 - Data analysis
 - Prior immunity
 - Virus transmission dynamic
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



Stall No.	Immune status of chickens	Week 1 (no turnover)	Week 2 (25% turnover)	Week 3 (50% turnover)
1	All 100 chickens H5 seronegative. 50 of 100 chickens H9 seropositive	Virus isolation on Day 1,4,6 Serology on Day 1 No turnover of chickens	Virus isolation on Day 8, 10, 12 Serology on Day 8 Replace 5 chickens on Day 8,9,10,11 and 12	Virus isolation on Day 15,17,19,21 Serology on Day 21 Replace 10 chickens on Day 15,16,17,18 and 19
2	All 100 chickens H5 and H9 seronegative			
3	All 100 chickens H5 seropositive (post vaccine) and H9 seronegative			

Cumulative proportion to experience event



Days to have virus isolated



Conclusions

- Slow virus transmission rate in stall with half population carried H9 antibody
 - No difference in the susceptibility to H9 virus between vaccinated (H5) and non-vaccinated chickens
 - Multiple cycles of infection occurring, with individual stalls oscillating in a similar pattern but over different time frames
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Conclusions (cont')

- Chickens can be re-infected with virus of the same subtype if their initial antibody titres were low
 - H9 virus is mainly shed through the respiratory route
 - Other transmission routes include drinking water, feed and handling
 - Basis for similar studies with H5N1 virus transmission
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